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This dissertation consists of three essays on health insurance markets, analyzing
the impact of employer premium contribution schemes on both the supply and
demand sides of the market. The first two essays focus on the supply side, whereas
the third essay looks at the demand side.
In the first essay, I present an analytical framework to illustrate the effect
of employer premium contribution schemes on health plan pricing. I model the
employer-sponsored health insurance market as a differentiated-product oligopoly
and study the pricing strategies of insurance plans before and after a policy change
in employer premium contribution. I find that the employer premium contribu-
tion scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based on two market
incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need to pay part
of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to increase the
employer’s premium contribution to that plan.
In the second essay, I confirm the theoretical predictions using 1991-2011 data
before and after a premium contribution policy change that occurred in 1999 in the
Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program. Empirical results suggest
that both market incentives mentioned above contribute to premium growth. Fur-
thermore, I perform counterfactual analysis to show that average premium would
have been 10% less than observed had the subsidy policy change not occurred in
the FEHB program, and the federal government would have incurred 15% less in
premium contribution.
The third essay looks at how capped employer premium subsidies affect the
level of adverse selection among consumers. Previous research suggests that the
employer premium contribution scheme can exacerbate or mitigate the level of
adverse selection among consumers. Using longitudinal health plan enrollment
records of federal civilian employees from years 1997-2000, I present empirical
results supporting previous theoretical as well as cross-sectional empirical evidence
on the dampening effect of a higher employer premium subsidy cap on adverse
selection. The overall level of adverse selection, approximated by the different
premium levels enrollees select based on their age, does not change significantly
over time in the FEHB program.
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In the U.S. most public and private employers offer employees health insurance
as a fringe benefit for risk pooling and tax reasons. Employer-sponsored health
insurance covered on average 60% of all Americans in recent years, with a higher
coverage rate among working Americans (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). The growth
rate of health plan premiums, however, has significantly outpaced that of gross
domestic product (GDP) in the past decade. A number of studies have investi-
gated why health insurance premiums have been growing at an alarming rate. For
instance, new medical technology and aging populations are known to play an im-
portant role in raising health care expenditures (e.g., Schwartz, 1987; Newhouse,
1992, 1993; Chandra and Skinner, 2012), which in turn increases health insurance
premiums.
Under employer-sponsored health insurance, employers usually contribute a
substantial portion of the premium, leaving workers responsible for only a small
1
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percentage. In light of this market design, I study whether the employer pre-
mium contribution scheme could be another channel that contributes to the rise in
health insurance premiums, and whether it has a differential impact on the pricing
behavior of health plans depending on their characteristics.
The premium contribution schemes vary across employers, depending on the
size and demographic composition of employees. One common premium-sharing
rule is a capped proportional contribution scheme where the employer contributes
a fixed percentage of the total gross premium, up to a dollar maximum.1 In order
to study how the pricing behavior of health plans reacts to changes in the premium
contribution scheme, I use 1991-2011 health plan data from the largest employer-
sponsored health insurance program in the U.S. – the Federal Employees Health
Benefits (FEHB) Program – which offers over 200 health plans per year to federal
employees across 50 states.
In the FEHB program, the federal government contributes 75% of any plan
premium up to a dollar maximum. Before 1999, the dollar maximum was 60%
of the simple average premium of the biggest six plans, which was referred to as
the “Big Six” formula. After 1999, a “Fair Share” formula took effect, and the
maximum employer contribution was calculated as 72% of the enrollment-weighted
1Virtually all employer premium contribution schemes can be viewed as a capped proportional
contribution scheme, given a certain fixed margin and a dollar maximum. When the dollar
maximum is very large, we have a simple proportional contribution scheme given a fixed margin.
When the dollar maximum is very small, we have a simple voucher system where each plan gets
the same amount of employer contribution.
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average premium of all health plans in the program.
Using this policy change as a natural experiment, I find that the employer
premium contribution scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based
on two market incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only
need to pay part of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive
to increase the employer’s premium contribution to that plan. Both incentives
contribute to premium growth.
I present an analytical framework to motivate the empirical findings and provide
intuition on the two market incentives discussed above. The health insurance
market is modeled as a differentiated-product oligopoly, where consumers choose
one health plan that maximizes their expected utility. Facing logit demand, plans
choose a gross premium to maximize their profits. By solving the best response
functions of health plans simultaneously, I obtain the equilibrium prices and market
shares under a capped employer contribution scheme. I then test the theoretical
predictions with empirical data from the FEHB program.
There are three main empirical findings: 1) due to difference in consumer price
sensitivity below and above the subsidy cap, plans below the subsidy cap increase
their premiums more than those above, 2) the farther away the plan premium is
below the subsidy cap, the faster the premium grows, whereas the opposite is true
for plans above the subsidy cap, and 3) when health plans are able to influence
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the employer premium contribution after 1999 through their program-wide market
share, larger plans above the subsidy cap have incentives to raise their premiums
more in order to push up the upper limit of the employer contribution.
Counterfactual analysis shows that average premium would have been 10%
less than observed had the subsidy policy change not occurred in the FEHB pro-
gram. Due to higher employer premium contribution under the new “Fair Share”
subsidy policy where the maximum employer contribution is endogenously deter-
mined by health plan premiums, the federal government bears most of the increase
in premium costs after 1999, and would have saved 15% per year on its premium
contribution toward the FEHB program.
Other than its supply-side effect, a premium contribution scheme could poten-
tially affect how consumers choose health plans as well. I supplement the health
plan information with micro-level consumer choice data in the FEHB program as
well as demographic characteristics of enrollees from years 1997-2000, and look
at whether the adverse selection pattern changed among plan enrollees after the
change in subsidy policy.
I confirm previous findings that a higher subsidy cap can reduce adverse se-
lection among enrollees. However, since the new subsidy policy effective in 1999
only changes the way the maximum employer contribution is determined, it is not
surprising that this policy change itself does not have much impact on adverse
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selection patterns among enrollee. This demand-side analysis further strengthens
the supply-side findings by exploring whether higher prices set by health plans
after the policy change are due to increased adverse selection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The remainder of Chapter 1
discusses the industry background and policy change this study focuses on. I
present an analytical framework of the health insurance market and derive the
theoretical implications of the policy change in Chapter 2, followed by empirical
evidence on the effect of employer premium contribution schemes on the pricing
behavior of health plans in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 looks at the effect of premium
subsidies on adverse selection as well as changes in the degree of adverse selection.
Chapter 5 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Employer Premium Contribution
Health care spending in the U.S. has climbed from 6% of the GDP in the 1960s
to the latest 18% in both 2009 and 2010, and at the same time, health insurance
costs have soared from 30% of the health care expenditures in 1960 to 76% in 2010
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2011). As a result, health insurance
now plays a pivotal role in the nation’s health care spending, and this role will only
be strengthened with the signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
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Act (ACA) in March 2010, which mandates universal individual health insurance
coverage.
There are many forms of health insurance, the most common being employer-
sponsored health insurance, which covers about 150 million non-elderly people in
the U.S. According to an annual national survey of non-federal private and public
employers conducted by Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educa-
tional Trust (2011), henceforth known as Kaiser/HRET, employers contribute on
average 82% of the premium for single coverage plans and 72% for family coverage
plans in 2011, similar to the percentages they contributed in 2010.2 In the largest
employer-sponsored health insurance program in the U.S., the FEHB program, the
federal government subsidizes 75% of any plan premium up to a dollar maximum,
leaving the rest of the premium to its employees.3
Since employer-sponsored health insurance has such a wide coverage in the
U.S., and premium sharing between the employer and the employee is common,
it is important to know whether the employer premium contribution scheme itself
can affect both the demand and supply side of health insurance.
In analyzing the role that contribution schemes play in health insurance mar-
kets, much of the previous literature has focused on the demand side. In 1995,
2The average percentage of employer contribution includes those who contribute 100% of the
premium.
3This employer contribution scheme applies to all federal civilian employees, annuitants, and
their dependents.
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Harvard University moved from a linear premium subsidy scheme, where premi-
ums are subsidized at a certain percentage rate, to a fixed contribution scheme,
where each plan receives the same amount of employer contribution. Using this
policy change, Cutler and Reber (1998) showed that the new fixed contribution
scheme induced significant adverse selection while reducing plan total premiums
by 5-8%, thus creating a net effect of welfare loss from adverse selection. By sim-
ulating the effect of lowering the subsidy cap to the lowest plan premium in the
market using data from the FEHB program, Florence and Thorpe (2003) found a
similar yet smaller effect.
Other than plan selection, researchers have also looked at whether premium
subsidy affects health insurance takeup. In the FEHB program, federal civilian
employees used to deduct their out-of-pocket insurance premiums from their after-
tax income. Starting from October 2000, they were allowed to pay their portion
of the premium on a pre-tax basis. After this tax subsidy policy change, however,
Gruber and Washington (2005) found little change in insurance takeup.
Other studies looking at tax subsidies have generally used data on health in-
surance takeup and amount purchased among the self-employed, thanks to recent
changes in tax laws on the deductibility for self-employed health insurance premi-
ums, but many have found mixed results (e.g., Gruber and Poterba, 1994; Selden,
2009; Heim and Lurie, 2009).
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Despite the abundant evidence on the effect of premium subsidy on the demand
for health insurance, there is relatively little discussion on the supply side regarding
how the employer premium contribution scheme affects premium growth. Accord-
ing to health benefits surveys of large employers with more than 200 workers con-
ducted by Kaiser/HRET, the annual growth rate in nominal employer-sponsored
health insurance premiums has consistently outpaced the rate of inflation (see Fig-
ure 1.1). After deflating the premiums in the FEHB program and comparing its
growth rate with GDP growth, Figure 1.2 shows that the real premium growth has
largely outpaced GDP in the last decade, even though it grew slower than GDP
in the late 1990s.4
There are undoubtedly many forces behind this persistent growth in health
insurance premiums. For example, advances in medical technology are known
to contribute to health care spending growth, which in turn leads to premium
growth.5 A number of studies attribute premium growth to market concentration
(e.g., Wholey et al., 1995; Dranove et al., 2003; Dafny et al., 2012).
Adverse selection and moral hazard of consumers, on the other hand, can also
contribute to rising premiums. Recent work on testing and documenting various
forms of information asymmetry has shown great promise in understanding the
complexity of the insurance market (e.g., Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004; Finkelstein
4Real premiums for family plans show a similar trend.
5See Chernew and Newhouse (2011) for a detailed literature review.
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and McGarry, 2006; Einav and Finkelstein, 2011). Relatively few studies, however,
have focused on supply-side moral hazard to look at the direct impact of employer
premium contribution schemes on the pricing strategies of health plans.
One assumption I make before analyzing the effect of premium contribution
schemes on plan pricing is that employee wages do not adjust immediately to
changes in the employer premium subsidies. The idea of sticky prices or wages goes
back to the 1980s when Akerlof and Yellen (1985) built a model of business cycles
incorporating sticky wages. It could be argued in the case of the FEHB program
1.2 Background 10
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that the federal government sets rigid pay schedules for all federal employees, and
do not frequently revise them over time. Wage adjustments, even if they do occur,
usually apply to the entire federal work force instead of a certain population.
1.2.2 Subsidy Policy Change
Effective January 1, 1999, the FEHB program changed the employer contribution
scheme for all federal civilian employees and annuitants, providing a natural labo-
ratory to study the effect of subsidy on premium growth. Before 1999, the federal
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government contributed 75% of any plan premium up to a dollar maximum, deter-
mined by 60% of the simple average of the so-called “Big Six” plans.6 Starting in
1999, under provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33),
while the federal government still contributes at most 75% of the gross premium,
the new subsidy cap is determined by a “Fair Share” formula, which is 72% of the
enrollment-weighted average premium of all health plans in the program.
Each Spring, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), who administers
the program, sends out a “call letter” outlining the basic benefits and reporting
requirements, along with any statutory changes that would apply to the next plan
year. The FEHB program has been widely touted as a model for Medicare reform
as well as the most recent state health insurance exchanges mandated by ACA,
partly due to its simple program design that allows market competition and low
administrative cost. The OPM does not actively negotiate premiums with plans
or solicit competitive bids (Feldman et al., 2002). Once a private health plan
meets the basic requirements stipulated by OPM, it can participate in the FEHB
program.
One paper that discusses premium growth in relation to employer premium
contribution schemes is by Thorpe et al. (1999), who showed that in the FEHB
6According to Thorpe et al. (1999), the “Big Six” plans are the two largest national employee
association plans, two largest health maintenance organization (HMO) plans, the Blue Cross
Blue Shield high-option plan, as well as a phantom plan whose premium is calculated each year
using the average increase in the other five plans.
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program, among plans whose employer contribution was below the subsidy cap,
premiums rose at least 5 percentage points faster annually from 1992 to 1999 than
plans above it. Nevertheless, their paper did not analyze the effect of the 1999
subsidy policy change.
By incorporating this policy change and extending the study period to 2011,
I contribute to the previous literature in three ways. First, under an analytical
framework, I show that there are two market incentives at play that contribute
to growth in employer-sponsored health insurance premiums. Second, I present
empirical evidence that supports these two market incentives and analyze their
impact on health plan pricing and premium growth. Third, I take a closer look
at the demand for employer-sponsored health insurance, and focus on the adverse
selection pattern under different employer premium contribution schemes.
Chapter 2
Market Incentives and Pricing Behavior in
Health Insurance: Analytical Framework
I model the employer-sponsored health insurance market as a differentiated-product
oligopoly. In reality, health plans also compete on their benefits, coverage, physi-
cian network, customer service, etc., but I will focus on the pricing strategy of
health insurance plans in this theoretical model.
On the demand side, consumers choose one health plan each year after compar-
ing all plans in their choice set. In order to motivate and provide intuition on some
of the empirical results discussed later, I adopt a simplified choice model where the
consumer’s utility function generates a logit demand system. Facing this demand,
a health insurance plan chooses a price, or a gross premium, to maximize its profit.
In employer-sponsored health insurance, an added complexity is that the price
consumers face is the plan’s net premium after deducting the employer contribu-
tion. When insurance plans decide on their gross premiums, their pricing strategies




In this simplified model, we have a consumer whose utility function is defined over
consumption of a health plan, which has multiple plan characteristics, of which
the most important one is price.
Consumer i’s utility when choosing plan j can be expressed as
Uij = αj − βjP̃j + εij, (2.1)
where αj captures all characteristics of plan j other than its price, βj is the price
response parameter for plan j, P̃j is the net premium the consumer pays, and εij is
an i.i.d. error term that is assumed to follow a type 1 extreme value distribution.
Consumers choose a health plan that yields the highest utility. Since the con-
sumer base in the data set is composed of those who choose a plan every year, we
do not consider an outside option here.1
Given this utility formulation, the logit demand model computes the share of
plan j in a local market relative to the other alternatives as
Sj =
exp(αj − βjP̃j)∑
J exp(αJ − βJ P̃J)
,
1In the data set we later use for empirical analysis, the percentage of employees who opt out
of the employer-sponsored health insurance offered by the FEHB program remains roughly the
same over time.
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where J indexes each plan in the consumer’s choice set.
Since in the FEHB program, the employer contributes 75% of any plan premium
up to a dollar maximum, employees pay at least 25% of the gross premium. As a
result, the net premium a consumer pays can be expressed as
P̃j = max(.25Pj, Pj − dollar maximum).
To help illustrate, I define the maximum gross premium a plan can charge, while
still being subsidized at the 75% margin by the employer, to be the “subsidy cap”
(dollar maximum/.75) used in the rest of the paper. For plans who set their gross
premiums below the subsidy cap, consumers pay P̃j = .25Pj, whereas for plans with
gross premium above the subsidy cap, consumers pay P̃j = Pj − dollar maximum.
Therefore, the newly defined subsidy cap acts as a cutoff point for health plan
gross premiums in terms of maximum subsidy benefits.
2.2 Supply
To keep the model simple, I consider a differentiated-product duopoly with two
health plans, plan 1 and plan 2, although one can easily extend the model to
accommodate more plans. Each plan has a constant marginal cost. Plan j chooses
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a gross premium Pj to maximize its profit
πj = PjDj(P̃ )− CjDj(P̃ ), (2.2)
where Dj is the demand for plan j, which depends on the net premium P̃ of all
plans, and Cj is its marginal cost.
If we normalize the market size to one, the demand for a health plan is equal
to its market share, Dj = Sj. Therefore, if an interior solution exists, the op-
timal price must satisfy the following first order condition (FOC) of the profit
maximization problem







J exp(αJ − βJ P̃J)
is the market share of plan j.
Before I present the analytical solutions to optimal health plan prices in the
existence of an employer premium subsidy, I consider the case where there is no
employer subsidy, i.e., P̃j = Pj for all j. Plan j’s market share can be written as
Sj =
exp(αj − βjPj)∑
J exp(αJ − βJPJ)
,
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Plugging the above expression in equation (2.3), we have




When the employer subsidizes health plan premiums, the FOC of a plan’s optimal
price can be derived in a similar fashion (see Appendix A).
2.3 Equilibrium Solutions
To facilitate understanding, I present the equilibrium solutions without an em-
ployer subsidy first, followed by solutions under a capped employer contribution
scheme before and after the policy change.
2.3.1 No Subsidy
Without an employer subsidy, the two plans in the market – plan 1 and plan
2 – have symmetric FOCs and market shares. For plan 1’s profit maximization
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problem, the FOC is




and market share is
S1 =
exp(α1 − β1P1)
exp(α1 − β1P1) + exp(α2 − β2P2)
. (2.6)
In order to solve the above two simultaneous equations, I follow the method used
by Aravindakshan and Ratchford (2011) and employ the concept of Lambert W
function, which can be numerically approximated.2
With the help of Lambert W function, we can now solve for the best response
function of plan 1 and its market share in terms of P2 and other exogenous variables:









exp(α1 − 1− β1C1)
exp(α2 − β2P2)
. Appendix B provides the proof.
2The Lambert W function is defined as W (x), which is the inverse function associated with
the equation W (x)eW (x) = x.
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By symmetry, the best response function of plan 2 and its market share are:









exp(α2 − 1− β2C2)
exp(α1 − β1P1)
.
The intersection of the two best response functions above, equations (2.7) and
(2.9), yields the equilibrium prices of the two plans.
2.3.2 With Subsidy: Big Six
Before 1999, when the subsidy policy changed, the maximum employer contribu-
tion was 60% of the simple average premium of the “Big Six” plans. Since these
“Big Six” plans on average only make up 2.5% of the total available health plans in
the FEHB program during years 1991-2011 (ranging from 1.4% to 4.3% depending
on the year), I will treat these plans’ gross premium (hence the subsidy cap) as
exogenous in the model before 1999. For ease of exposition, I model the remaining
health plans in the FEHB program as a differentiated-product duopoly.3
Since before 1999, the dollar maximum the employer contributes to any health
plan is determined exogenously (to the rest of the plans) by the premium of the
3In a separate model, I group all the “Big Six” plans as one plan in the market and treat all
other plans in the market as the second plan, the theoretical implications do not change very
much.
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“Big Six” plans, I denote it with a constant c. The subsidy cap is defined as dollar
maximum/.75, which then equals c/.75. In each period, plan 1 submits a premium
bid of P1. When plan 1 prices above the subsidy cap before the policy change,
consumers pay a net premium of P1− c; when plan 1 prices below the subsidy cap,
however, consumers pay .25P1.
Similarly, plan 2 can also price below or above the subsidy cap, which gives
us four cases to consider. I present the solutions to plan 1’s profit maximization
problem in the first case below, which is when plan 1 prices above and plan 2 prices
below the subsidy cap. Appendix C.1 presents plan 1’s equilibrium solutions in the
remaining three cases. Since the pricing game the two plans play here is symmetric,
I only present plan 1’s solutions.
• Case 1: P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap
In this case, consumers pay a net premium of P̃1 = P1 − c for plan 1 and
P̃2 = .25P2 for plan 2. Instead of the unconstrained optimization seen in Section
2.3.1 when there is no subsidy, we now have a constrained optimization problem
with the inequality conditions P1 − c/.75 ≥ 0 and P2 − c/.75 ≤ 0. Since only plan
1’s price constraint has the argument P1 in it, the Lagrangian function of plan 1’s
profit maximization problem can be written as:
L(P1, λ) = (P1 − C1)D1 + λ(P1 − c/.75).
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The FOC of the interior solution when the constraint does not bind (P1 > c/.75)
is




which looks almost the same as the no-subsidy case, except that its market share
is now
S1 =
exp(α1 − β1(P1 − c))
exp(α1 − β1(P1 − c)) + exp(α2 − .25β2P2)
. (2.12)
Following the same procedure to solve the simultaneous equations as the no-
subsidy case, I derive the best response function of plan 1 and its market share in
terms of P2 as follows:








where P1 > c/.75, P2 ≤ c/.75, and x =
exp(α1 − 1− β1(C1 − c))
exp(α2 − .25β2P2)
. When plan 1’s
constraint binds, we have the corner solution P ∗1 = c/.75.
Since the Lambert W function can be numerically approximated, I plot the best
response functions of plan 1 and plan 2 in Figure 2.1 when the dollar maximum
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c = 100, after initiating some parameter values.4 There is a kink in each plan’s best
response function because of the constraint that plan 1 prices above the subsidy
cap, which is equal to c/.75 = 100/.75 = 133.3, and plan 2 prices below the subsidy
cap. When I set the dollar maximum c to be smaller, such as the actual 1998 dollar
maximum level (c = 66) observed in the FEHB program, plan 2 would price at the
subsidy cap (c/.75 = 88) at all times (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Prices of the Two Plans Before 1999
(subsidy cap = 100/.75, P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap)




















4α1 = 3, α2 = 0, β1 = β2 = .1, C1 = 70, and C2 = 65.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Prices of the Two Plans Before 1999
(subsidy cap = 66/.75, P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap)
















2.3.3 With Subsidy: Fair Share
After 1999, the dollar maximum of employer contribution is set at 72% of the
enrollment-weighted average of all plan premiums. If we denote the lagged program-
wide market share (or enrollment weight) of the two plans as w1 and w2, respec-
tively, the maximum employer contribution can now be expressed as .72(w1P1 +
w2P2). As a result, the maximum gross premium a plan can charge that is still
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subsidized at the 75% margin, namely the subsidy cap, is .72(w1P1 +w2P2)/.75 =
.96(w1P1 + w2P2).
Again, depending on whether plan 2 chooses to price above or below the sub-
sidy cap, plan 1’s profit function can change. Given the new subsidy cap policy,
however, it is not possible for both plans to price below the subsidy cap. I briefly
present the interior as well as corner solutions to the profit maximization problem
of plan 1 in the first case below, leaving the remaining cases to Appendix C.2.
The solutions to the profit maximization problem of plan 2, on the other hand,
can be derived by substituting the subscript 2 for 1 in all cases, since the two plans
play a symmetric simultaneous-move game. Therefore, I do not present plan 2’s
equilibrium solutions here.
• Case 1: P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap
After the policy change, since the subsidy cap is now .96(w1P1 + w2P2), when
plan 1 prices above the subsidy cap and plan 2 prices below, we have two inequality
constraints:
P1 ≥ .96(w1P1 + w2P2),
P2 ≤ .96(w1P1 + w2P2).
It turns out that only the second constraint is needed since it automatically
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implies the first one. The net premiums consumers pay for plan 1 and plan 2 are
P̃1 = P1− .72(w1P1+w2P2) and P̃2 = .25P2, respectively. The Lagrangian function
of plan 1’s profit maximization problem can be written as:
L(P1, λ) = (P1 − C1)D1 + λ(.96(w1P1 + w2P2)− P2).
Consider the interior solution first. When the constraint does not bind, the FOC
of plan 1 is






exp(α1 − β1(P1 − .72(w1P1 + w2P2)))
exp(α1 − β1(P1 − .72(w1P1 + w2P2))) + exp(α2 − .25β2P2)
. (2.16)
Solving the above simultaneous equations, we get the following closed form solution
to be plan 1’s best response function and market share, in terms of P2:
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where P2 < .96(w1P
∗
1 + w2P2) and x =
exp(α1 − 1− β1(1− .72w1)C1)
exp(α2 − (.25β2 + .72w2β1)P2)
.







. Plugging the above expression into plan 1’s






exp(α1 − β1((1− .72w1)1−.96w2.96w1 P2 − .72w2P2)))
exp(α1 − β1((1− .72w1)1−.96w2.96w1 P2 − .72w2P2))) + exp(α2 − .25β2P2)
.
(2.20)
When drawing the best response functions, in addition to using the same pa-
rameter values as in Section 2.3.2 before the subsidy policy change, I assume
w1 = .8 and w2 = .2, since the lagged global market shares now enter the equilib-
rium conditions. Figure 2.3 shows the best response functions of plan 1 and plan
2 as well as their equilibrium price levels when plan 1 prices above the subsidy cap
and plan 2 prices below.
Next I reassign w1 = w2 = .5, and keep all the other parameter values the same.
The new equilibrium price levels of the two plans are illustrated in Figure 2.4, with
both best response functions shrinking a little bit compared to Figure 2.3. Again,
the kinks in both plans’ best response functions are due to the constraint that plan
1 prices above the subsidy cap and plan 2 prices below. The new equilibrium price
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levels of both plans are lower than the previous case, when plan 1 has a larger
market share (w1 = .8) and plan 2 has a smaller market share (w2 = .2).
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Prices of the Two Plans After 1999
(subsidy cap = .96(w1P1 + w2P2), P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap)
























From the best response functions of health plans, we can derive comparative statics
describing how optimal prices, or premiums, change with respect to the following
three market conditions: 1) consumer price sensitivity, 2) local competition, and
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Prices of the Two Plans After 1999
(subsidy cap = .96(w1P1 + w2P2), P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap)

































3) global market share of the health plan.
2.4.1 No Subsidy
• Price Sensitivity
As mentioned in section 2.3, the solutions to the profit maximization problem
of plan 1 and plan 2 are symmetric. Due to this reason, I consider plan 1’s first
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order condition only. We know from equation (2.7) that





exp(α1 − 1− β1C1)
exp(α2 − β2P2)
.
To obtain comparative statics in terms of consumer price sensitivity, I take the
first partial derivative of the equilibrium price of plan 1 (P ∗1 ) with respect to its






C1β1 + 1 +W (x)
β21
< 0.
The partial derivative is negative since W (x) is greater than zero when x is positive,
and all the other parameters in the above equation are positive as well. This result
is expected since the more price-sensitive consumers are, the less likely plans are
to raise prices. By symmetry, we reach a negative sign for plan 2’s comparative
static in consumer price sensitivity.
• Local Competition
The impact of local competition on insurance premiums comes from prices
charged by other plans, which in turn affects a plan’s market share. If there are
multiple plans in the market, an increase in the price of one plan can lead to an
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increase in the price of others, and if that is the case, we call these plans strategic
complements.
To find out whether the plans are strategic complements or substitutes, I take
the first partial derivative of the equilibrium price of plan 1 (P ∗1 ) from equation









Since the sign is positive, we conclude that the health plans are strategic comple-
ments in this market.
When there are multiple plans in the market, under Bertrand competition, firms
compete on prices. It is thus reasonable to think that the larger the total number
of plans in the market, the more downward pressure there is on plan premiums.
Since plans are strategic complements, when one plan lowers its premium, all other
plans would lower their premiums as well. Therefore, we would expect the total
number of plans in a market to be negatively correlated with premium levels and
growth rates.5
• Market Share
Equation (2.5) shows the FOC of plan 1 when there is no subsidy. The equilib-
rium price and market share are determined simultaneously in this static model.
5One can derive similar results assuming Cournot competition in the health insurance market.
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In order to analyze how market share affects equilibrium prices, we need a measure
for the plan’s previously existing market share, which does not enter the equilib-
rium equations when there is no subsidy. Later, however, when the subsidy policy
is dependent on the previous market share of plans, we will be able to derive the
comparative statics for lagged market share.
2.4.2 With Subsidy
• Price Sensitivity
When the employer offers a capped premium subsidy to its health plan enrollees,
consumers exhibit different price sensitivity levels for plans above and below the
subsidy cap. Intuitively, consumers pay only 25 cents for each $1 increase in gross
premium for plans below the subsidy cap, due to the fact that their insurance
premiums are subsidized at the 75% margin. For plans above the subsidy cap,
however, a $1 increase in gross premium is fully borne by the consumer.
Mathematically, we can compare plan 1’s best response function when it prices
below or above the subsidy cap, holding plan 2’s price constant. For example, we
can look at case 1 and case 4 before 1999, when there exists a capped employer
premium subsidy and plan 2 prices below the subsidy cap. Judging from equation
(2.13) and equation (C.6) in Appendix C.1, we find that plan 1’s price sensitivity
parameter becomes .25β when plan 1 prices below the subsidy cap in case 4, com-
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pared to above the cap in case 1, while holding plan 2 pricing below the cap. The
new comparative static in terms of price sensitivity,
∂P ∗1
∂β1
, remains negative when
there is an employer subsidy. Therefore, the existence of a proportional employer
subsidy gives insurance plans an incentive to charge higher gross premiums when
pricing below the subsidy cap than above.
• Local Competition
Under the existence of an employer subsidy scheme, health plans still remain
as strategic complements to each other. Taking the first partial derivative of each
plan’s equilibrium price with respect to the other plan’s premium, I derive a pos-
itive sign for the comparative static,
∂P ∗i
∂Pj
, under all cases considered in sections
2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
It is possible that the downward pressure on premiums increases as more plans
enter the market. Additionally, that pressure can vary depending on whether the
market is composed of plans mostly above or below the subsidy cap. If most of
the plans price above the subsidy cap in a market, the market is considered a
high-cost market. Conversely, if most of the plans price below the subsidy cap in a
market, in which case a consumer only pays 25% of an additional dollar raised by
the health plan, it is deemed a low-cost market. Feldman et al. (2002) hypothesize
that competition matters more in high-cost markets whereas it would have a a
smaller impact in low-cost markets.
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• Market Share
Before the subsidy policy change in 1999, the current market share of a health
plan is co-determined in the model along with its premium, and the subsidy cap
does not depend on the market share of the non-“Big Six” plans. After 1999,
however, the new subsidy cap is determined by the lagged enrollment-weighted
average of all the newly submitted premium bids. Therefore, I expect lagged plan
enrollment size, or lagged market share, to play a role in plans’ pricing behavior
after 1999.
Taking P2 as given, plan 1 would set an optimal price (P
∗
1 ) depending on
the subsidy policy. Before 1999, plan 1 (a non-“Big Six” plan) takes the dollar
maximum (c) as given in addition to P2. After 1999, however, the dollar maximum
becomes endogenous in that each plan has some weight in determining its level:
the larger the plan’s market share, the more influence it has on setting the dollar
maximum.
For illustrative purposes, I derive the closed form solution to the first partial
derivative of plan 1’s price (P ∗1 ) with respect to its lagged market share (w1) from












2.4 Comparative Statics 34
where x =
exp(α1 − 1− β1(1− .72w1)C1)
exp(α2 − (.25β2 + .72w2β1)P2)
.
The intuition behind this result is that if plan 1 prices above the subsidy cap
and has a large market share, it will have an incentive to increase its premium bid
for the upcoming year, which could in turn help raise the upcoming subsidy cap
given plan 1’s large weight in determining the dollar maximum.
In comparison, plan 2, which prices below the subsidy cap, faces a different
situation. Taking the first partial derivative of plan 2’s equilibrium price equation















exp(α2 − 1− (.25β2 + .72w2β1)C2)
exp(α1 − β1(1− .72w1)P1)
.
The intuitive reason for the negative sign here, as opposed to the positive sign
derived earlier in the case of plan 1, is that a low enrollment weight of plan 2
indicates a large enrollment weight enjoyed by plan 1. The smaller the plan’s
market share is, the more it anticipates plan 1 to raise the premium. As a result,
the smaller the plan is, the more it raises its own price to keep up with the subsidy
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cap. Taken together, the comparative statics of the above-cap plan 1 and the below-
cap plan 2 discussed above explain the reason why we observe lower equilibrium
prices in Figure 2.4, when the two plans share the market equally than when plan
1 enjoys a larger market share than plan 2.
2.5 Policy Experiment
Keeping the same parameter values described in Section 2.3.2, I conduct a policy
experiment to see how the new subsidy policy could change the equilibrium prices
of the two plans in the market.
As shown in Figure 2.5, I first plot both plans’ equilibrium prices with respect
to the exogenous dollar maximum c before 1999 and indicate them with red and
blue lines, under the constraint that plan 1 prices above the subsidy cap and plan
2 prices below.6
Second, I set c = 66, which is the actual 1998 biweekly dollar maximum level
in the FEHB program, and indicate the equilibrium prices P ∗1 and P
∗
2 with red and
blue circles under the pre-1999 “Big Six” subsidy policy.
Third, I change the way the dollar maximum is determined from the “Big Six”
formula to the “Fair Share” formula, assuming there is no behavioral change in
health plans. When w1 = .8 and w2 = .2, I derive the new dollar maximum
6Before the policy change in 1999, for the equilibrium price of plan 2, I assume P ∗2 = c/.75.
Then given both c and P ∗2 , I can derive P
∗
1 based on plan 1’s best response function.
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium Prices of the Two Plans Under Different Policies
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2 with red and blue triangles. The reason I phrase these new equilibrium price
levels as “naive” is that we are assuming the two plans would consider the dollar
maximum exogenous as before and therefore react in the same way as the pre-1999
case facing a new c′.
However, as shown in Section 2.3.3, after the policy change in 1999, the two
plans now choose their price levels taking into account the fact that the dollar
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maximum is now a function of their own prices. As a result, their best response
functions are different from the pre-1999 case and dependent on their lagged market
shares w1 and w2. In Figure 2.5, I indicate the actual equilibrium price levels after
1999 with red and blue stars (*), given the same parameter values used before. In
this case, the equilibrium price levels of both plans are higher than the “naive”
prices after we let the plans internalize the maximum employer contribution.
Chapter 3
Market Incentives and Pricing Behavior in
Health Insurance: Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The data set I use to empirically analyze the pricing behavior among health insur-
ance plans is provided by the Office of Personnel Management, who oversees the
FEHB program. It contains information on characteristics of all self-only health
plans offered in the FEHB program from years 1991-2011. Although the subsidy
policy change applies to both federal civilian employees and annuitants in self-only
as well as family plans, I focus on federal civilian employees under age 65 who
enroll in self plans only, due to other possible health insurance coverage (such as
Medicare) faced by annuitants and the lack of information on dependents among
those who enroll in family plans.1
Each year, OPM contracts with over 200 plans. A health plan in a certain year
1FEHB plans charge both civilian (non-postal) and postal federal employees the same gross
premium, but the government subsidizes at a much higher margin (around 85% in 2012) for
postal workers.
38
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is defined as a unique combination of a federal plan code and an option code (high
or standard). If a plan is fee-for-service (FFS), it is offered nationwide and open to
anyone covered by FEHB. A managed care (non-FFS) plan, however, is associated
primarily with one state, and only residents within that state, or sometimes within
certain counties, can enroll.
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics for average plan characteristics of
all years. The average annual premium in nominal terms increases in most years,
as does the subsidy cap. The average annual growth rates of real premiums and the
subsidy cap are close in magnitude, given the subsidy cap for the new plan year is
determined by the premium bids submitted by insurance plans, whether through
a simple average before 1999 or an enrollment-weighted average after 1999.
At the same time, the total number of plans increased in the late 1990s, before
falling back in the early 2000s due to mergers and consolidation among health
maintenance organization (HMO) plans. Figure 3.1 plots the growth rate of real
premiums along with the average number of health plans per state in the previous
year, which shows a strong negative correlation between the two variables.
Over time, the percentage of plans who price below the subsidy cap decreased
(see Figure 3.2), meaning more plans have caught up with the subsidy cap and are
taking full advantage of the employer premium contribution. Table 3.2 tabulates
the real premium growth rate of plans who priced below versus above the subsidy
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics 40















(Nom $) (Nom $) (%) (%) (No.) (No.) (No.)
1991 1,752 1,521 4.4 94.5 1,423 384 15
1992 1,894 1,573 4.2 95.3 1,445 384 15
1993 2,017 1,675 4.0 95.3 1,428 379 15
1994 2,107 1,721 3.8 95.2 1,325 398 15
1995 2,034 1,596 3.3 96.5 1,132 455 17
1996 1,987 1,599 3.0 96.5 1,010 492 18
1997 1,992 1,634 3.3 96.5 983 490 17
1998 2,095 1,715 3.3 96.2 1,059 453 16
1999 2,265 1,874 3.9 96.1 1,309 363 14
2000 2,477 2,050 5.0 95.3 1,583 300 12
2001 2,807 2,251 6.7 93.7 2,244 255 11
2002 3,220 2,544 8.7 93.4 2,980 196 9
2003 3,601 2,842 9.6 90.9 3,291 187 9
2004 3,891 3,156 8.8 88.8 3,054 205 10
2005 4,164 3,408 8.5 81.4 2,528 247 11
2006 4,436 3,619 7.5 79.0 2,207 281 12
2007 4,694 3,690 6.7 75.1 2,191 285 12
2008 4,919 3,771 6.7 71.7 2,243 283 12
2009 5,183 4,047 7.1 69.4 2,479 268 12
2010 5,507 4,358 8.1 67.9 2,976 234 11
2011 6,055 4,697 9.2 66.2 3,340 207 10
Mean 2,987 2,401 5.3 89.3 1,786 350 14
Source: OPM
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Year
Premium growth rate Lagged # plans per state
Data includes self plans only.
Source: U.S. Office of Personnel Management
cap. We see a clear pattern that plans who priced below the subsidy cap in the
previous year choose to grow faster than plans pricing above, especially before
1999, confirming the findings by Thorpe et al. (1999). After 2000, however, the
difference between the two diminished.
One concern is that plans below the subsidy cap could grow faster than plans
above merely due to their lower base premium. Therefore, I also graph the average
premium change for plans above and below the subsidy cap over time in Figure
3.3, which shows that plans below did increase their premiums more on average
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Table 3.2: Premium Growth Below and Above the Subsidy Cap
Premium Growth (%)
Year Below Above Difference
1992 7.0 1.3 5.7 ***
1993 5.7 1.7 4.0 ***
1994 3.3 -0.6 3.9 ***
1995 -4.1 -8.7 4.6 ***
1996 -2.5 -7.0 4.5 ***
1997 0.6 -4.2 4.8 ***
1998 5.6 1.7 3.9 ***
1999 8.7 1.9 6.8 ***
2000 7.0 2.8 4.2 ***
2001 11.3 9.2 2.1 *
2002 14.0 10.8 3.2 *
2003 13.8 7.8 6.0 ***
2004 9.5 9.3 0.2
2005 6.4 5.1 1.3
2006 6.0 3.5 2.5 **
2007 5.1 2.5 2.6 **
2008 3.0 1.7 1.3
2009 9.4 6.9 2.5 **
2010 7.9 5.8 2.1 *
2011 9.7 9.3 0.4
Mean 5.3 2.0 3.3 ***
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Source: U.S. Office of Personnel Management
than those above, although that difference diminished after 1999.
Ideally, I would like to explicitly control for aggregated demographic charac-
teristics of enrollees under each health plan such as their age, gender, education,
and salary. Unfortunately, I only have enrollees’ demographic information in the
FEHB program from years 1991-2000. By examining the enrollee characteristics
among years before 2000, however, I find very little change in the demographic
composition of federal employees. It is understandable since the population of
federal employees remains fairly stable over time.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
In order to examine the impact of a capped subsidy policy on premium growth, I
propose three different regression specifications, each focusing on a separate chan-
nel through which the employer subsidy policy can affect the pricing strategies
among health plans.
The impact from local competition is taken into account in all specifications
by introducing the lagged number of plans existing in a local market as well as a
plan’s lagged local market share.
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• Price Sensitivity
First, I look at whether the policy affects plans below or above the subsidy
cap differently. As seen in Table 3.2, the difference in growth rate between plans
below and above the subsidy cap diminished after the policy change, but without
controlling for other explanatory variables, we cannot draw the conclusion that the
policy change was responsible for this dampened relationship.
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, I estimate the first baseline
regression model in the following form:
∆Pjst = β0 + β1 Postt + β2 Belowjs,t−1 + β3 Belowjs,t−1 × Postt
+ β4 Planss,t−1 + β5 LocalSharejs,t−1 +X
′
jstΓ + θs + εjst
(3.1)
The unit of observation in the equation above is plan j in state s and year t.
Since I am interested in the effect of the subsidy policy on plan premium changes
(rather than premium levels) over time, the dependent variable, ∆Pjst, is the first
difference in real biweekly gross premium of each plan, i.e. ∆Pjst = Pjst − Pjs,t−1.
The Postt dummy variable takes on a value of one for years greater than or
equal to 1999. The Belowjs,t−1 dummy variable indicates whether plan j in state
s prices below the subsidy cap in year t − 1. I also include an interaction term
between Postt and Belowjs,t−1 in order to capture any differential impact before
and after the subsidy policy change. The variables Planss,t−1 and LocalSharejs,t−1
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indicate the total number of self-only plans and plan j’s local market share in state
s and year t− 1.2
Notice that all the explanatory variables mentioned above, except for the Postt
dummy, are lagged variables in year t − 1 compared to the rest of the variables.
The reason for this specification is that when plans submit their premium bids for
year t in April of year t−1, they do not yet have the market-specific characteristics
such as the number of plans in year t available to them. As a result, I assume they
decide how much to increase premium next year based on the existing information
in the current year.
The plan control variables Xjst include dummy variables such as whether the
plan is “Big Six”, FFS, high option, and whether it has a companion high or
standard option. Additionally, I collect plan benefits and quality measures from
the annual Guide to Federal Employees Health Benefits Plans distributed by OPM,
and introduce changes in outpatient copay, hospital deductible, generic and brand
drug copay, as well as each plan’s national accreditation status in the regressions.
Last but not least, I include state fixed effects, described by θs, to control for
time-invariant state-specific characteristics.
The coefficient β2 in equation (3.1) tells us whether plans below the subsidy cap
do grow faster than plans above, and β3 indicates whether after the subsidy policy
2In order to capture health plan competition within the local market only, I do not include
the nation-wide FFS plans in the calculation of the number of local plans.
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change, the sign and magnitude of that difference stay the same. Coefficients β4
and β5 capture local competition effect.
In the second specification, I introduce the distance of how far away the plan’s
lagged gross premium is from last year’s subsidy cap into the equation, and interact
it with whether the lagged premium is below or above the subsidy cap, as well as
whether it is before or after the policy change. The second estimation equation
can be written as follows:
∆Pjst = β0 + β1 Postt + β2 Belowjs,t−1 + β3 Belowjs,t−1 × Postt
+Distancejs,t−1 × {β4 Belowjs,t−1 × Pret
+ β5 Abovejs,t−1 × Pret + β6 Belowjs,t−1 × Postt
+ β7 Abovejs,t−1 × Postt}+ β8 Planss,t−1
+ β9 LocalSharejs,t−1 +X
′
jstΓ + θs + εjst
(3.2)
The dummy variables Belowjs,t−1 and Abovejs,t−1 indicate whether plan j in state
s prices below or above the subsidy cap, and Distancejs,t−1 tells us how far its gross
premium is from the subsidy cap in year t−1. The dummy Pret is an indicator for
whether the year is before 1999. Compared to the baseline specification, equation
(3.2) has the added independent variables estimated by β4 through β7, which gives
us a closer look at how plans’ premium increase decisions are affected by their
current price level relative to the subsidy cap before and after the policy change.
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• Market Share
Next I look at whether the plan’s program-wide global market share, as opposed
to its local market share, could impact its pricing behavior after the policy change.
Since the subsidy cap before 1999 is the simple average premium of the “Big Six”
plans regardless of the enrollment pattern of the remaining plans, I do not expect
a plan’s lagged global market share to play a role in influencing premium growth
before 1999 unless the plan itself is one of the “Big Six.” After all, we have already
included the plan’s local market share in the regression model. After the policy
change, however, the subsidy cap is determined by an enrollment-weighted average
of all plan premiums in the program, which would potentially have a differential
impact on plans of different enrollment sizes, or global market shares. Therefore,
I specify the third estimation equation as follows:
∆Pjst = β0 + β1 Postt + β2 Belowjs,t−1 + β3 Belowjs,t−1 × Postt
+GlobalSharejs,t−1 × {β4 Belowjs,t−1 × Pret
+ β5 Abovejs,t−1 × Pret + β6 Belowjs,t−1 × Postt
+ β7 Abovejs,t−1 × Postt}+ β8 Planss,t−1
+ β9 LocalSharejs,t−1 +X
′
jstΓ + θs + εjst
(3.3)
The global market share of plan j in state s and year t − 1, GlobalSharejs,t−1, is
calculated as the percentage of enrollees choosing plan j among all federal civil-
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ian employees in the FEHB program who enroll in self-only plans.3 Comparing
equation (3.3) with (3.1), I am now allowing a plan’s lagged global market share
to play a role in determining next year’s premium, with potentially heterogeneous
effects depending on whether the plan prices above or below the subsidy cap, and
whether it occurs before or after the policy change.
In all three regression specifications discussed above, due to the inclusion of
the Post dummy variable, which is equal to one for all years greater than or equal
to 1999, I do not include year fixed effects. In order to account for macroeconomic
shocks such as advances in medical technology and an aging population, I need to
introduce some time trends. As a result, for all three specifications, I add separate
linear time trends before and after the policy change, and later year fixed effects
(after getting rid of the Post dummy) as model variants. In an attempt to control
for time-invariant characteristics at the plan code level, I also try including plan
code fixed effects in lieu of state fixed effects.
Another way to control for time-varying plan benefits changes is to introduce
state-by-year fixed effects, assuming all the plans in the same local market share
some general trend in terms of changes in benefits and coverage. However, given
3I choose the denominator to be the total number of federal civilian enrollees in the FEHB
program who choose self-only plans because the new subsidy policy effective in 1999 uses the same
methodology to calculate enrollment weights for the subsidy cap. However, since the new subsidy
cap also takes into account enrollment among postal workers when calculating the enrollment-
weighted average, my measure is an approximation of the program-wide market share since our
plan data does not include those for postal workers.
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the sample size of my data set of around 5700 observations, including state-by-year
fixed effects would introduce around 1000 dummy variables, if we multiply the 50+
states by 20 years from 1992-2011, which would significantly decrease the degrees
of freedom in my regression estimation.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Regression Results
Recall that when a plan prices below the subsidy cap the employer subsidizes 75%
of the gross premium, and consumers only pay 25 cents of every one-dollar increase
in the gross premium. On the other hand, when a plan prices above the subsidy
cap, the employer subsidizes a fixed dollar maximum, and a one-dollar increase in
the gross premium in this case will be fully borne by the consumer. As a result,
considering the different price sensitivities faced by consumers, health plans will
price accordingly depending on whether they are above or below the subsidy cap.
Echoing the results presented in Table 3.2, the consumer sensitivity OLS es-
timates in Table 3.3 from regression equation (3.1) show that before 1999, plans
below the subsidy cap would increase their real biweekly premiums by $5 to $8
more on average compared to plans above the cap, which is around $130 to $208
per person per year.4 After 1999, however, the average biweekly increase seen in
4Premiums are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and expressed in year 2000
dollars.
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plans below the cap is only around $2 more than plans above, which translates
into a $52 increase per year. Therefore, even though premiums among plans below
the subsidy cap still grow faster than plans above after the policy change, the
magnitude is largely dampened.
Table 3.3: Premium Level Change: Consumer Sensitivity
Basic Linear Trend FE (1) FE (2)
Post 10.56∗∗∗ 10.80∗∗∗
(0.731) (0.786)
Below 5.923∗∗∗ 5.686∗∗∗ 5.028∗∗∗ 7.920∗∗∗
(0.501) (0.515) (0.490) (0.713)
Below × Post −4.612∗∗∗ −4.064∗∗∗ −3.223∗∗∗ −2.525∗∗∗
(0.793) (0.789) (0.750) (0.913)
Plans −0.276∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.0507
(0.0365) (0.0411) (0.0449) (0.0563)
LocalShare 3.002∗∗∗ 2.887∗∗∗ 2.216∗∗ 8.955∗∗∗
(0.857) (0.889) (0.892) (2.068)
Plan Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Plan Code FE Y es
State FE Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es
N 5746 5746 5746 5746
adj. R2 0.159 0.165 0.242 0.250
Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference in real biweekly plan premium.
Separate linear time trends before and after 1999 included in column 2.
Additional plan control variables include plan characteristics as well as benefits
and quality changes.
Standard errors clustered at the plan code level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The coefficient on the lagged number of plans turns out to be negative as
expected, indicating that local competition can keep premium growth in check.
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One caveat is that although statistically significant, the magnitude of the impact
from local competition is relatively small – one more plan in the local market
only decreases the average biweekly plan premium by less than a dollar. One
explanation is that plans within a local market are differentiated enough that they
are able to limit the effect of competition, which is also why larger plans seem to
be able to charge higher premiums, as the local market share of a plan is positively
correlated with the level of premium increase. Another explanation is that due to
little switching among enrollees, large plans are able to capture more consumers
even if they raise prices.
The Post dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level, showing that
real biweekly plan premiums increase around $11 more on average after the “Fair
Share” formula took effect, which is an annual increase of $286, even after taking
into account separate linear time trends for the two time periods before and after
1999. The Post dummy has to be omitted in the third and fourth columns when
I include year fixed effects in the model, but all the other regression coefficients
remain relatively stable.
The results from the second specification, as shown in Table 3.4, indicate that
conditional on pricing below the subsidy cap, the farther away a plan is from the
cap, the faster it grows. After controlling for plan code fixed effects, for plans below
the subsidy cap before 1999, being one more dollar away from the cap translates
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roughly into an additional 36-cent increase in biweekly premium next year, or
around $10 annually, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the opposite is true for
plans above the subsidy cap, as all of the coefficients are negative. After 1999,
however, the effect of distance from the subsidy cap on premium growth is largely
dampened for all plans, similar to the results discussed earlier in Table 3.3.
In terms of global market share, the results in Table 3.5 are as expected in
that the program-wide enrollment share of a plan did not influence its premium
growth before 1999, whereas the coefficients are significant at the 1% level after the
policy change when we include state and year fixed effects. In column 4, the sign
and the magnitude of the coefficient for the above-cap plans after 1999 indicate
that a 1% increase in the global market share of an above-cap plan would lead to
an almost 20-cent increase in the plan’s biweekly gross premium next year, which
is approximately a $5 increase in annual premium. Moreover, the signs of the
coefficients for the effect of global market share among below-cap plans after 1999
are consistent with theory predictions.
In all three specifications, the regression coefficients do not change much across
different models as indicated by each separate column. In column two I include
separate linear time trends for before and after the policy change, in column three
I present estimates including year fixed effects, and in column four I drop state
fixed effects and include plan code fixed effects instead. It is possible that plans
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Table 3.4: Premium Level Change: Distance from the Subsidy Cap
Basic Linear Trend FE (1) FE (2)
Post 10.49∗∗∗ 10.31∗∗∗
(1.119) (1.173)
Below 2.007∗∗ 2.033∗∗ 1.601∗ 2.175∗∗
(0.975) (0.976) (0.920) (1.087)
Below × Post −2.160∗ −1.540 −1.320 −0.554
(1.187) (1.188) (1.116) (1.310)
Distance × Below × Pre 0.196∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0222) (0.0397)
Distance × Above × Pre −0.133 −0.126 −0.130 −0.286∗∗
(0.0868) (0.0874) (0.0860) (0.112)
Distance × Below × Post 0.0245∗ 0.00113 0.0237∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0140) (0.0367)
Distance × Above × Post −0.0670∗ −0.0763∗ −0.0713∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0389) (0.0347) (0.0439)
Plans −0.262∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −0.0360
(0.0381) (0.0424) (0.0471) (0.0649)
LocalShare 2.582∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗ 1.779∗∗ 7.167∗∗∗
(0.847) (0.889) (0.897) (2.034)
Plan Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Plan Code FE Y es
State FE Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es
N 5746 5746 5746 5746
adj. R2 0.171 0.176 0.252 0.290
Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference in real biweekly plan premium.
Separate linear time trends before and after 1999 included in column 2.
Additional plan control variables include plan characteristics as well as benefits and
quality changes.
Standard errors clustered at the plan code level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Premium Level Change: Global Market Share
Basic Linear Trend FE (1) FE (2)
Post 10.55∗∗∗ 10.78∗∗∗
(0.741) (0.802)
Below 6.007∗∗∗ 5.775∗∗∗ 5.106∗∗∗ 8.070∗∗∗
(0.506) (0.520) (0.496) (0.712)
Below × Post −4.571∗∗∗ −4.009∗∗∗ −3.121∗∗∗ −2.425∗∗∗
(0.810) (0.806) (0.763) (0.936)
GlobalShare × Below × Pre −6.633 −2.664 2.241 −3.862
(5.258) (5.857) (5.164) (18.43)
GlobalShare × Above × Pre 19.96 25.49 24.65 42.93∗
(18.74) (17.99) (15.26) (24.29)
GlobalShare × Below × Post −18.15 −22.44∗∗ −28.02∗∗∗ −40.12
(11.12) (10.69) (10.50) (40.88)
GlobalShare × Above × Post 7.433∗∗ 8.333∗∗ 10.83∗∗∗ 19.58∗∗
(3.691) (4.004) (3.824) (8.652)
Plans −0.277∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.0560
(0.0365) (0.0411) (0.0449) (0.0563)
LocalShare 2.925∗∗∗ 2.759∗∗∗ 2.001∗∗ 8.675∗∗∗
(0.923) (0.951) (0.935) (2.139)
Plan Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Plan Code FE Y es
State FE Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es
N 5746 5746 5746 5746
adj. R2 0.159 0.165 0.242 0.250
Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference in real biweekly plan premium.
Separate linear time trends before and after 1999 included in column 2.
Additional plan control variables include plan characteristics as well as benefits and
quality changes.
Standard errors clustered at the plan code level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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of the same plan code but different option code (high or standard) tend to follow
the same pricing strategy over time, therefore I estimate clustered standard errors
of the coefficients by allowing correlation within the same plan code.
In addition, I test for serial correlation using the method derived by Wooldridge
(2001) for linear panel-data models. For all model variants in the first and third
regression specifications presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.5, the null hypothesis that
there is no first-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected. For the second specifi-
cation, however, the null hypothesis is rejected, which means that the standard
errors reported in Table 3.4 could be understated.
As a result, I re-estimate the second regression specification involving the dis-
tance of the premium from the subsidy cap by allowing an AR(1) process in the
error term. It turns out that all the variables in interest still bear the same sign
as in Table 3.4 and are statistically significant, with the only difference being
coefficients having larger magnitudes.
3.3.2 Counterfactual Simulation
In the following counterfactual analysis, I simulate the trajectory of the average
annual gross premium in the FEHB program had the pre-1999 subsidy policy
remained in effect, or had the health plans not changed their pricing strategies
facing the new subsidy policy.5 First, I estimate the following regression model
5Same as before, premiums here are deflated using CPI and expressed in year 2000 dollars.
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using the pre-1999 data set, with the same set of plan control variables (Xjst)
mentioned in Section 3.2 as well as both state (θs) and year (ηt) fixed effects:
∆Pjst = β0 + β1 Belowjs,t−1 +Distancejs,t−1 × {β2 Belowjs,t−1
+ β3 Abovejs,t−1}+ β4 Planss,t−1 + β5 LocalSharejs,t−1
+X ′jstΓ + θs + ηt + εjst
(3.4)
One way to take into account the time trend for post-1999 counterfactual pre-
mium prediction is to introduce a linear trend. However, we know from reality
that the time trend is far from linear. In order to better model how the average
premium changes over time after 1999, I calculate the post-1999 year fixed effects
using the average percentage increase in health insurance premiums observed in
large firms that sponsor health insurance programs during years 1999-2011. These
average growth rates of large firms are reported in annual Kaiser/HRET surveys
of employer-sponsored health benefits.6
In the post-1999 prediction equation, I use the simulated real gross premiums
to produce the counterfactual subsidy cap, in order to determine independent vari-
ables such as Belowjs,t−1 and the two interaction terms that involve Distancejs,t−1.
Based on either the pre-1999 “Big Six” formula or the post-1999 “Fair Share” for-
mula, I first calculate the counterfactual subsidy cap, then determine whether the
6Before 2008, I took the average growth rates for large firms with 5,000 or more workers.
After 2008, however, only growth rates for large firms with 200 or more workers are reported.
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health plans price below or above the subsidy cap, and finally find out the distance
of these simulated premiums to the counterfactual “Big Six” or “Fair Share” sub-
sidy cap. For other plan and state characteristics, however, I use the actual data
from years 1999-2011. The regression coefficients are taken directly from equation
(3.4) above in order to maintain the pre-1999 data generating process.
Figure 3.4 shows the counterfactual trajectories of the average annual real gross
premium after 1999 along with the actual real premium observed in the data set. It
is clear that the counterfactual average premiums using both formulas stay below
the actual premium throughout the post-1999 period, albeit being pretty close
during 2007-2008. The mean dollar difference between the actual real premium
and the simulated counterfactual real premium is around $320 under the “Big
Six” formula and $290 under the “Fair Share” formula per person per year, which
means that average premium in the FEHB program would have been around 10%
less than observed after 1999.
I also plot the maximum annual employer contribution in real dollars after 1999
under different scenarios in Figure 3.5. The actual dollar maximum consistently
surpasses the counterfactual maximum employer contribution, meaning that health
plans would have faced a lower subsidy cap had they maintained the same pricing
strategies or behaviors as before 1999, while facing either the “Big Six” or the
“Fair Share” formula after 1999.
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Figure 3.4: Actual Vs. Counterfactual Average Annual Real Gross Premium
























Finally, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 plot the actual versus predicted average annual
employee and employer contribution for all years after the subsidy policy change. It
appears that employees would have contributed the most amount of premium had
the pre-1999 “Big Six” subsidy policy stayed in effect, whereas the employer would
have incurred the least premium contribution costs among the three scenarios. In
comparison, if the “Fair Share” formula took effect in 1999, but the health plans
did not adjust their pricing behavior – meaning if they kept their pre-1999 pricing
strategies – then we would have seen a similar level of average employee premium
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Figure 3.5: Actual Vs. Counterfactual Maximum Employer Contribution































contribution to the actual figures, while at the same time the employer would still
have contributed less.
The average difference between the actual and counterfactual annual employer
contribution in year 2000 dollars is around $350 under the “Big Six” formula and
$250 under the “Fair Share” formula per person per year. In percentage terms,
the $350 savings in annual subsidies represent a 15% drop in average employer
contribution. If we assume that the same counterfactual results apply to family
plans, and we consider the fact that the FEHB program covers 9 million enrollees,
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then the new subsidy policy is costing the federal government $3.15 billion a year.
Under the “Fair Share” formula, market incentives exist such that large above-
cap plans want to increase their premiums, while at the same time below-cap plans
want to catch up with the subsidy cap. Taken together, the new “Fair Share”
subsidy policy in the FEHB program seems to have pushed up the average gross
premium level as well as employer subsidies, which contradicts the original intent
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to curb government spending and balance the
nation’s budget.
Figure 3.6: Actual Vs. Counterfactual Average Annual Employee Contribution
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Figure 3.7: Actual Vs. Counterfactual Average Annual Employer Contribution
































3.4 Extensions and Robustness Checks
The results thus far have shown that plans below the subsidy cap increase pre-
miums more than plans above, although the magnitude is much smaller after the
“Fair Share” subsidy policy took effect in 1999. The reason for this dampened
magnitude was due to the fact that plans in the program have internalized the
subsidy cap under the “Fair Share” formula – in that they can now influence the
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dollar maximum directly – especially if they are large above-cap plans as measured
by their program-wide global market share. As a result, large plans above the sub-
sidy cap are increasing their premiums more than before, which counteracts the
premium increase among plans below the subsidy cap. In this section, I present
several extensions and robustness checks to complement the main results.
3.4.1 Premium Growth Rate
In order to get an idea of the premium growth rate under different employer contri-
bution schemes, which would help us better gauge the magnitude of the increase, I
use the percentage change in premium level as the dependent variable and rerun all
the regression specifications discussed previously. The results are shown in Tables
3.6 through 3.8, and are very similar to those described in Section 3.3.
The average increase in premium growth rate after 1999 is estimated to be 8-11
percentage points higher than before. Among health plans below the subsidy cap,
their premiums increase on average 6-8% faster than plans above, although after
1999, the magnitude falls back to 4-6% when compared to plans above.
In terms of the effect of the distance between plan premium and the subsidy
cap, the sign and magnitude of the coefficients among the four interaction terms
remain the same when we look at premium growth rates instead of level changes.
Finally, the program-wide global market share did not matter before 1999, but
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Table 3.6: Premium Growth Rate: Consumer Sensitivity
Basic Linear Trend FE (1) FE (2)
Post 8.261∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗
(0.580) (0.728)
Below 6.374∗∗∗ 6.021∗∗∗ 5.222∗∗∗ 8.056∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.510) (0.479) (0.716)
Below × Post −2.703∗∗∗ −2.507∗∗∗ −1.551∗∗ −1.453∗
(0.645) (0.645) (0.603) (0.778)
Plans −0.172∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.0920∗∗ −0.0471
(0.0322) (0.0349) (0.0369) (0.0478)
LocalShare 1.592∗∗ 1.584∗∗ 1.120 6.858∗∗∗
(0.722) (0.708) (0.713) (1.563)
Plan Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Plan Code FE Y es
State FE Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es
N 5746 5746 5746 5746
adj. R2 0.134 0.139 0.228 0.230
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage change in real biweekly plan premium.
Separate linear time trends before and after 1999 included in column 2.
Additional plan control variables include plan characteristics as well as benefits
and quality changes.
Standard errors clustered at the plan code level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Premium Growth Rate: Distance from the Subsidy Cap
Basic Linear Trend FE (1) FE (2)
Post 9.113∗∗∗ 11.24∗∗∗
(0.818) (0.946)
Below 1.738∗∗ 1.734∗∗ 1.234 2.065∗∗
(0.824) (0.817) (0.756) (0.927)
Below × Post −0.331 −0.699 −0.377 0.199
(0.951) (0.960) (0.892) (1.098)
Distance × Below × Pre 0.299∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0321) (0.0296) (0.0484)
Distance × Above × Pre −0.0661 −0.0680 −0.0721 −0.199∗∗∗
(0.0573) (0.0563) (0.0545) (0.0742)
Distance × Below × Post 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0730∗∗∗ 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0134) (0.0129) (0.0358)
Distance × Above × Post −0.0711∗∗∗ −0.0662∗∗∗ −0.0626∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0178) (0.0255)
Plans −0.138∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.0805∗∗ −0.0233
(0.0342) (0.0371) (0.0397) (0.0575)
LocalShare 1.474∗ 1.600∗∗ 1.268∗ 6.614∗∗∗
(0.759) (0.743) (0.754) (1.705)
Plan Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Plan Code FE Y es
State FE Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es
N 5746 5746 5746 5746
adj. R2 0.162 0.165 0.252 0.297
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage change in real biweekly plan premium.
Separate linear time trends before and after 1999 included in column 2.
Additional plan control variables include plan characteristics as well as benefits and
quality changes.
Standard errors clustered at the plan code level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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afterward, among plans above the subsidy cap, the larger they are, the more they
grow, whereas the opposite is true for plans below the cap.
After including plan code and year fixed effects, a one-percentage increase in an
above-cap plan’s global market share would contribute to a 14 basis point increase
in the plan premium, which in turn pushes up the maximum employer contribution.
3.4.2 Low- Versus High-Cost Markets
The main empirical results show that the downward pressure on premiums in-
creases as more plans enter the market. As an empirical extension, I show that
this competition pressure can vary across local markets depending on whether the
market is composed of plans mostly above or below the subsidy cap. As discussed
in Section 2.4.2, the hypothesis is that competition matters less in low-cost markets
where most of the plans are below the subsidy cap.
I test this hypothesis using the same FEHB data set described before, and
estimate the following regression specification:
%∆Pjst = β0 + β1 Postt + β2 Belowjs,t−1 + β3 Belowjs,t−1 × Postt
+ β4 Planss,t−1 + β5 PercBelows,t−1
+ β6 Planss,t−1 × PercBelows,t−1
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Table 3.8: Premium Growth Rate: Global Market Share
Basic Linear Trend FE (1) FE (2)
Post 8.284∗∗∗ 11.08∗∗∗
(0.592) (0.739)
Below 6.460∗∗∗ 6.111∗∗∗ 5.294∗∗∗ 8.202∗∗∗
(0.505) (0.517) (0.486) (0.722)
Below × Post −2.648∗∗∗ −2.466∗∗∗ −1.466∗∗ −1.400∗
(0.659) (0.659) (0.613) (0.803)
GlobalShare × Below × Pre 0.268 −0.869 3.446 −5.280
(3.884) (3.813) (3.796) (11.38)
GlobalShare × Above × Pre 27.66 28.78 24.77∗ 39.09∗
(19.18) (18.56) (13.77) (23.73)
GlobalShare × Below × Post −27.10∗∗∗ −23.35∗∗ −26.41∗∗∗ −34.47
(9.411) (9.088) (9.356) (39.58)
GlobalShare × Above × Post 7.278∗∗ 6.959∗∗ 9.019∗∗∗ 14.12∗∗
(3.052) (2.930) (2.812) (6.964)
Plans −0.171∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.0898∗∗ −0.0505
(0.0322) (0.0350) (0.0370) (0.0479)
LocalShare 1.480∗ 1.470∗ 0.930 6.684∗∗∗
(0.766) (0.755) (0.744) (1.638)
Plan Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Plan Code FE Y es
State FE Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es
N 5746 5746 5746 5746
adj. R2 0.134 0.139 0.228 0.230
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage change in real biweekly plan premium.
Separate linear time trends before and after 1999 included in column 2.
Additional plan control variables include plan characteristics as well as benefits and
quality changes.
Standard errors clustered at the plan code level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Compared to the baseline model in equation (3.1), the newly added explanatory
variables here are those preceded by β5 and β6. The variable PercBelows,t−1 stands
for the percentage of plans within a local market (in state s and year t − 1) that
price below the national subsidy cap determined by either the pre-1999 “Big Six”
formula or the post-1999 “Fair Share” formula. In the specification above, I do not
include the state fixed effects since the variable PercBelows,t−1 is a state-specific
variable that varies little over time in some smaller states.
According to our hypothesis, plans in low-cost markets should face lower con-
sumer price sensitivity, thus dampening the effect of competition on premium
growth. As shown in the first column of Table 3.9, the sign of the coefficient
for the interaction term between Planss,t−1 and PercBelows,t−1 is positive, coun-
teracting the negative coefficient in front of the variable Planss,t−1. This result
suggests that in low-cost markets where the percentage of plans below the subsidy
cap is high, competition matters less in that the composite effect of competition
is measured by both β4 and β6.
After we include state fixed effects in column 2, however, the coefficient β6 is
no longer significant. On the other hand, the coefficient β5 on PercBelows,t−1 is
now positive and significant, meaning that plans in low-cost states tend to increase
their premiums faster, possibly in an attempt to catch up with the subsidy cap.
When we include both state and year fixed effects, these market-based variables
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can no longer explain the variation in premium growth.
Table 3.9: Premium Growth Rate: Low- Versus High-Cost Markets
Basic FE (1) FE (2)
Post 8.789∗∗∗ 8.644∗∗∗
(0.535) (0.584)
Below 5.601∗∗∗ 5.714∗∗∗ 5.067∗∗∗
(0.519) (0.523) (0.494)
Below × Post −2.658∗∗∗ −2.893∗∗∗ −1.643∗∗∗
(0.633) (0.643) (0.601)
Plans −0.123∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.0635
(0.0559) (0.0746) (0.0719)
PercBelow −0.704 3.211∗∗∗ 1.608
(0.938) (1.096) (1.032)
Plans × PercBelow 0.126∗ 0.108 −0.0377
(0.0687) (0.0790) (0.0741)
LocalShare 0.540 1.626∗∗ 1.128
(0.713) (0.733) (0.723)
Plan Controls Y es Y es Y es
State FE Y es Y es
Year FE Y es
N 5746 5746 5746
adj. R2 0.122 0.135 0.227
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage change in real biweekly
plan premium. Additional plan control variables include whether the
plan is “Big Six”, FFS, high option, and whether it offers a companion
high or standard option.
Standard errors clustered at the plan code level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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3.5 Conclusion
Many studies have tried to figure out why health insurance premiums and expen-
ditures have been growing much faster than GDP in the last decade. Few studies,
however, have looked at the effect of employer premium contribution schemes on
the pricing strategies of health plans. Using a subsidy policy change that occurred
in the largest employer-sponsored health insurance program in the U.S., the Fed-
eral Employees Health Benefits Program, I study whether and how the employer
premium contribution scheme affects health plan pricing.
With the help of a simplified analytical framework featuring differentiated prod-
ucts, I show that there are two market incentives that contribute to higher health
insurance premiums: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need
to pay part of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to
increase the employer’s premium contribution to that plan.
Empirically, using the capped employer contribution scheme in the FEHB pro-
gram as an example, I find that the “Fair Share” formula that took place in 1999
under the Balanced Budget Act introduced incentives for large health plans above
the subsidy cap to raise their premiums more, after learning that the maximum
employer contribution is now determined by an enrollment-weighted average of all
plan premiums. At the same time, health plans below the subsidy cap still increase
their premiums more than above-cap plans due to lower consumer price sensitivity.
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Taken together, both market incentives contribute to higher insurance premiums
in the FEHB program.
Under the new “Fair Share” formula, health plans internalized the subsidy cap
and pushed the upper limit of the employer premium contribution higher than it
would have been under the “Big Six” formula. As a result, the federal government
ended up bearing most of the increase in premium costs. In the absence of the new
subsidy policy, average premium level would have been 10% lower than observed,
and the federal government would have incurred 15% less in premium contribution
toward the FEHB program.
These findings suggest that employer premium contribution schemes can influ-
ence health plan pricing strategies and significantly impact total premium costs.
Admittedly, instead of choosing the optimal premium level in each period stati-
cally as modeled in this paper, a health plan might base next year’s premium on
its previous premium levels as well as its expectation of future market conditions.
A richer dynamic model would allow us to analyze the entry and exit decisions of
plans over time, in response to changes in employer premium contribution schemes,
although such a model is beyond the scope of this paper. Future research topics
can thus explore other potential impacts of the employer premium contribution
scheme on the supply of health insurance.
Chapter 4
Capped Premium Subsidies and Adverse
Selection: A Closer Look
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I focus on the supply side of the FEHB market and show
that a capped employer premium contribution scheme does provide health plans
with different market incentives in terms of their pricing strategies. The plan
premiums we observe, however, are influenced both by the supply and the demand
side of the market. In an open enrollment health insurance program such as the
FEHB market, adverse selection occurs when healthy individuals with low risks
choose more moderate and sometimes suboptimal plans, so that they can separate
themselves from the high-risk pool. As a result, high-risk individuals are more
likely to choose plans with more generous coverage.
Previous literature has indicated that employer premium contribution schemes
can affect adverse selection patterns. As mentioned in Section 1.2.1, a fixed contri-
bution scheme, such as one equating the subsidy cap to the lowest plan premium,
72
4.1 Introduction 73
induces significant adverse selection (e.g., Cutler and Reber, 1998; Florence and
Thorpe, 2003). Depending on the design of the employer contribution scheme,
however, certain subsidy policies can also reduce adverse selection. In a theoret-
ical framework building on the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Selden
(1999) suggested that in the presence of a capped premium subsidy, adverse se-
lection can be mitigated without generating excessive plan coverage. Later, using
1996 cross-sectional data from the FEHB program, Gray and Selden (2002) empir-
ically examined the relationship between adverse selection and capped premium
subsidies, confirming that a higher premium subsidy in the FEHB program helps
reduce adverse selection.
In light of the literature mentioned above and the subsidy cap policy change
in 1999, I use a panel data set of health plan enrollment choices of federal civilian
employees from 1997-2000 – two years before and after the policy change – to
take a closer look at the effect of capped premium subsidies on adverse selection.
Analyzing enrollment choices in the FEHB program will help us determine whether
the overall premium increase we observe could also be attributed to changes in
consumer choice patterns, such as whether there exists more adverse selection
under the new “Fair Share” subsidy policy.
The results confirm previous findings on the dampening effect of a higher em-
ployer premium subsidy cap on adverse selection. The overall level of adverse
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selection, approximated by the different premium levels enrollees select based on
their age, does not change significantly over time, which suggests that the subsidy
policy change moving from the “Big Six” to the “Fair Share” formula does not
have a discernible impact on enrollee choices.
4.2 Background
The notion of adverse selection stems from information asymmetry, where one
party in a transaction has more or better information than the other. Adverse
selection widely exists in insurance markets, such as one that deals with health
insurance. For instance, it is common to observe that healthy people tend to pick
cheaper health plans like managed care, whereas people with higher health risks
choose more generous plans.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) first developed a theoretical framework to an-
alyze adverse selection in the insurance market. Information asymmetry occurs
because insurance buyers know more about their own risks than the insurance
company, who cannot distinguish between high- versus low-risk consumers. In the
real world, however, adverse selection can occur even when insurance companies
can observe individual risks but are not able to price accordingly. For example, in
employer-sponsored health insurance markets, the employer must offer the same
premium to all individuals who choose to enroll in a certain plan, and cannot price
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discriminate based on observed demographic characteristics such as age. One way
to make high-risk buyers reveal themselves is for the insurance company to offer
different types of plans, so that a separating equilibrium could be reached where
high-risk individuals choose plans with higher premiums and low-risk buyers pick
more moderate plans. Such an equilibrium is not the first-best solution, since
low-risk individuals choose to purchase suboptimal insurance in order to avoid
cross-subsidizing high-risk consumers.
Most recently, Einav and Finkelstein (2011) presented a graphical framework
to help people understand selection in insurance markets, potential government in-
terventions, and the corresponding welfare issues. Through drawing the marginal
cost and average cost curves along the demand curve, they point out that ineffi-
ciency arises from adverse selection because the market equilibrium depends on the
relationship between average cost and demand, whereas efficiency is determined
by the relationship between marginal cost and demand. When adverse selection
exists, the marginal cost curve always lies below the average cost curve, thus gener-
ating welfare loss. Furthermore, they show that if insurance coverage is subsidized
by, for example, a positive lump sum subsidy toward the insurance premium, the
welfare loss will be unambiguously lower.
There has been a substantial amount of empirical work on information asym-
metry. Einav et al. (2010) give a broad overview of empirical models and analyses
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on insurance markets, including how to estimate individual insurance demand and
aggregate welfare distortions under adverse selection. In terms of documenting ad-
verse selection in health insurance markets, most have focused on the association
between coverage and risk after controlling for observables.1 The methodologies
used to uncover the coverage-risk relationship vary widely across different insur-
ance markets based on the type of insurance analyzed, such as how exclusive it
is. Chiappori and Salanié (2013) describe the various empirical methods used in
recent literature to test the coverage-risk relationship.
In order to theoretically analyze the impact of premium subsidies on adverse
selection in the health insurance market. Selden (1999) built on the model of
Rothschild and Stiglitz to allow premium subsidies to the consumers. They find
that it is possible to reach a separating equilibrium under a linear premium subsidy
that Pareto dominates the market outcome with no subsidies. Furthermore, a
capped linear subsidy, such as the premium contribution scheme adopted in the
FEHB program, could potentially relax the incentive compatibility constraints
on plan choice for low-risk consumers, hence achieving a more equitable pooling
equilibrium and reducing adverse selection.
In the context of the FEHB program, due to data limitation on enrollee de-
mographic characteristics, the variables that can be used to approximate health
1For a detailed literature review, see, for example, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), Cutler
(2002), and Cohen and Siegelman (2010), among others.
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risks are age and gender. Previous research interested in adverse selection in the
FEHB program has mostly looked at how the average enrollee age differs across
plans (e.g., Gray and Selden, 2002; Florence and Thorpe, 2003). Despite the lack
of detailed demographic information, the FEHB program does provide us with am-
ple geographic price variation in terms of the premium subsidies enrollees receive,
which presents itself as a great data source for analyzing the impact of premium
subsidies on adverse selection.
Using enrollee health plan choices in the 1996 FEHB program, Gray and Selden
(2002) find that a capped premium subsidy scheme can help control adverse selec-
tion in the employer-sponsored health insurance market. Their empirical strategy
is to exploit the fact that even though there is a constant nominal subsidy cap
across all geographic regions in the FEHB program, the real value of the subsidy
cap varies greatly across local markets in the U.S. due to different price levels.
A state with a high cost of living might see most of its plans pricing above the
nation-wide subsidy cap, which in my sample period, is determined either by a
simple average of the “Big Six” plans or a weighted average of all FEHB plans.
Using the natural experiment arising from price variations across local markets,
they expect that the coverage-risk relationship, which is measured by the premium-
age relationship in the FEHB program, would be the strongest in markets where
the subsidy cap is the lowest, if a higher subsidy helps reduce adverse selection.
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4.3 Data and Summary Statistics
I use health insurance enrollment choices of federal civilian employees under 65
years old to complement the health plan data set described in Section 3.1, although
due to data limitation, I do not observe individual enrollment choices after year
2000. Since the policy change occurred at the start of 1999, I take two years
before and after the policy change (1997-2000) to analyze adverse selection among
enrollees who chose self-only plans.
As shown in Table 4.1, during years 1997-2000, the average age of federal
civilian employees under 65 who enrolled in self-only plans was 45 years old, the
percentage of female enrollees was 55%, and the average education level was 10
years, all of which did not change much over time. The average nominal salary
increased over time, and so did the average premium level. Since the maximum
employer contribution (dollar max) was derived from plan premiums based on
either the “Big Six” or the “Fair Share” formula, it increased at the same pace
as average premium. Over time, the percentage of enrollees who chose FFS plans
increased by 1-2%, whereas the percentage choosing high-option plans dropped
from the original 61% to 55% in 2000.
In terms of the coverage-risk relationship among enrollees in the FEHB pro-
gram, following Gray and Selden (2002), I examine the relationship between the
gross premium of the health plan enrollees choose, which is an indicator for in-
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Table 4.1: Mean Statistics for Enrollee Characteristics




(Yrs) (%) (Yrs) ($) ($) ($) (%) (%)
1997 44.02 55.05 9.78 43,036 2,114 1,634 55.27 61.24
1998 44.50 55.12 9.82 44,786 2,268 1,715 55.47 59.40
1999 45.02 55.20 9.83 46,976 2,497 1,874 56.64 57.21
2000 45.37 55.35 9.85 49,703 2,732 2,050 57.93 54.86
Mean 44.72 55.18 9.82 46,098 2,400 1,816 56.32 58.21
Source: OPM
surance coverage under competitive conditions, and their age at the time of en-
rollment, which is an observable characteristic that approximates health risks. In
order to avoid depicting variation in insurance premiums due to differences in cost
of living or inflation over time, as an illustration, Figure 4.1 plots the relationship
between nominal annual gross premium and enrollee age among federal employees
aged 22-64 located in Washington, DC in year 2000. I observe a positive correla-
tion between age and premium among both male and female enrollees, although
after an upward climb during ages 22-40, both lines flatten out somewhat.
Since OPM sets the same nation-wide nominal level for maximum employer
premium contribution every year, people in different states, such as New York
versus Wyoming, potentially face different levels of real employer subsidy. Many
plans in a high-cost state such as New York might end up pricing above the subsidy
cap, whereas plans in rural Wyoming could all be below the cap. Following Gray
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and Selden (2002), I convert the nominal dollars into real values using a price
index, the Geographic Practice Cost Index (GPCI) published by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).2 Since CMS only publishes the GPCI on
their website as early as year 2000, and the index does not change drastically over
time, I use the GPCI in year 2000 to convert the nominal plan premiums and
subsidy caps for all four years during 1997-2000. Based on the year 2000 GPCI
locality code, the finest geographic area to which I could assign a unique price
2The GPCI is a geographic price adjustment index that takes the weighted average of the
relative value of work (52%), practice expense (44%), and malpractice (4%) in a local area.
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index was at the state level.
As a result, nominal health plan premiums and the subsidy cap in the same
state are converted using a single GPCI value. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution
of the real annual subsidy cap (dollar max/.75) faced by all enrollees, deflated by
GPCI (to control for geographic price variation) as well as CPI (to control for
inflation over time) in all four years. The standard deviation of the real annual
subsidy cap ranges from 150 in year 1997 to 175 in year 2000, which suggests that
there is a fair amount of variation in medical care prices across states.
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4.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to look at whether the degree of adverse selection changes over time, I need
a measure for risk segmentation, which I approximate by looking at the different
premium levels enrollees select based on their age. If adverse selection occurs in
the FEHB program, we would expect the coefficient on the age variable to be
positive, meaning that older (presumably less healthy) people are more likely to
select more expensive plans with generous coverage, after taking into account other
demographic characteristics such as gender, education, and salary. According to
Polzer (1998), a plan attracting primarily high-risk enrollees can cost several times
as much for approximately the same level of benefits as a plan made up of healthier
enrollees.3
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, I first estimate a baseline re-
gression model similar to Gray and Selden (2002), in order to confirm the effect of
the subsidy cap on adverse selection.
lnPist = β0 + β1 lnAgeist + β2 lnCapst + β3 lnAgeist × lnCapst
+X ′istΓ + εist
(4.1)
The unit of observation in the equation above is individual i in state s and year t.
3An example would be Aetna’s high- and standard-option plan in the FEHB program, which
did not differ much in terms of actuarial values, but the high-option plan’s premium was more
than twice as high as the standard-option plan.
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The dependent variable, lnPist, is the natural logarithm of the real biweekly gross
premium of individual i’s health plan. The Ageist variable describes individual i’s
age in state s and year t. The Capst variable stands for the real biweekly subsidy
cap in state s and year t, which is state-specific since the GPCI value varies at the
state level.
The coefficient β3 on the interaction term between Age and Cap is the key
parameter of interest, since it tells us how much the degree of adverse selection
( ∂P
∂Age




The control variables Xist include individual demographic characteristics (gen-
der, education, and salary) as well as the total number of self-only plans in the
individual’s local health plan market. I do not include any health plan benefits or
quality measures since they are the resulting outcomes of the individual’s choice
and hence endogenous.
As a separate variant of the baseline model, I include state fixed effects to
control for time-invariant state-specific characteristics. When I include both state
and year fixed effects, however, the variable Cap needs to be dropped due to
collinearity. In doing so, I take advantage of the panel structure of the data set
and introduces more controls than the cross-sectional regression model in Gray
and Selden (2002).
Furthermore, I look at whether the degree of adverse selection changed during
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the sample period 1997-2000, two years before and after the implementation of the
subsidy cap policy change. Compared to equation (4.1), the newly added variables
of interest here are the interaction terms between Age and the year dummies,
which capture changes in adverse selection over time:
lnPist = β0 + β1 lnAgeist + lnAgeist × {β2 1(1998) + β3 1(1999)
+ β4 1(2000)}+ β5 lnCapst + β6 lnAgeist × lnCapst
+X ′istΓ + εist
(4.2)
The policy change from a “Big Six” formula to a “Fair Share” formula affects
the pricing strategies of health plans, as evidenced in the previous chapter. In
theory, a health plan experiencing adverse selection would have to charge a higher
premium to offset the cost of insuring less healthy individuals. However, it is not
clear whether and how the subsidy policy change would affect consumers’ choice of
health plans, or adverse selection. The year dummies from 1998-2000 in equation
(4.2) try to address this question.
4.5 Results
Table 4.2 presents the regression results from the first specification. The coefficient
on the Age variable is positive and significant across different variants of the base-
line model, meaning that we do observe adverse selection in the FEHB program
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among federal civilian employees with self-only plans. Since both the dependent
variable, real plan premium, and the Age variable are in natural logarithm form,
the coefficient on Age indicates that, on average, a 10% increase in age is associated
with a 1-2% increase in the real premium of the chosen plan.
Table 4.2: Premium Subsidies and Adverse Selection
Basic FE (1) FE (2)




lnAge × lnCap −0.0244∗∗∗ −0.0314∗∗∗ −0.0472∗∗∗
(0.00309) (0.00303) (0.00298)
Controls Y es Y es Y es
State FE Y es Y es
Year FE Y es
N 1843561 1843561 1843561
adj. R2 0.707 0.724 0.734
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individuals’ real biweekly
plan premium. Additional control variables include individual demographic
characteristics as well as the number of health plans in the local market.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
It is not surprising that the average level of plan premiums chosen by enrollees
moves at the same pace as the subsidy cap – with a coefficient estimated at around
one – since the subsidy cap in year t is determined by plan premiums in year t,
whether it is based on a “Big Six” or “Fair Share” formula. Similar to Gray and
Selden (2002), I find that a higher subsidy cap helps reduce adverse selection,
given the coefficient on the interaction term between Age and Cap is negative and
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significant.
The change in adverse selection over time, however, is less conclusive as shown
in Table 4.3. In all three columns, the three coefficients on interaction terms
involving year dummies are negative and significant, meaning that compared to the
base year (1997), there was less adverse selection among enrollees in subsequent
years, possibly due to a higher subsidy cap. However, the magnitudes of the
coefficients on all year dummies are very small compared to the coefficient on the
Age variable in the base year, especially when I include state and year fixed effects.
Thus, I do not observe more adverse selection among enrollees after the subsidy
policy change in 1999. In the meantime, the effect of premium subsidies on adverse
selection changed little when compared to Table 4.2. I expect to reach a more
conclusive finding if I have more years of enrollment data, in which case I will be
able to observe the long-run impact of the subsidy policy change.4
As a robustness check, instead of looking at the premium-age relationship, I
use a dummy variable FFS as the dependent variable – indicating whether or not
the individual’s chosen health plan is FFS – and run a linear probability model
using the same regression specifications as before. FFS plans are generally more
expensive than managed care plans since they offer more coverage and benefits,
which is more attractive to older people with higher health risks. It turns out that
4A Freedom of Information Act data request on federal employee enrollment choices in the
FEHB program has been sent to OPM, and I am hoping to receive the data in the future.
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Table 4.3: Adverse Selection Over Time
Basic FE (1) FE (2)
lnAge 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0186) (0.0186)
lnAge × 1(1998) −0.0147∗∗∗ −0.0134∗∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗
(0.0000569) (0.000218) (0.000843)
lnAge × 1(1999) −0.0108∗∗∗ −0.00791∗∗∗ −0.0157∗∗∗
(0.0000627) (0.000649) (0.000930)




lnAge × lnCap −0.0150∗∗∗ −0.0371∗∗∗ −0.0372∗∗∗
(0.00305) (0.00414) (0.00414)
Controls Y es Y es Y es
State FE Y es Y es
Year FE Y es
N 1843561 1843561 1843561
adj. R2 0.720 0.734 0.734
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individuals’ real biweekly
plan premium. Additional control variables include individual demographic
characteristics as well as the number of health plans in the local market.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
4.6 Conclusion 88
all key parameters yield the same sign and significance level as those shown in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3, telling a similar story about the effect of premium subsidies on
adverse selection as well as enrollees’ sorting pattern over time.
4.6 Conclusion
I look at the pattern of adverse selection in the FEHB program under a capped
employer premium contribution scheme. Previous literature has suggested that the
level of adverse selection can differ under various subsidy schemes, and a capped
premium subsidy, depending on how high the cap is, can potentially alleviate
adverse selection thanks to the contribution from the employer.
Using FEHB enrollment choice data from years 1997-2000, two years before and
after the subsidy policy change, I find empirical results that support the damp-
ening effect of a higher employer premium subsidy cap on adverse selection, with
magnitudes similar to those found in Gray and Selden (2002). In addition, the
overall level of adverse selection remains relatively stable during the sample period
1997-2000, which suggests that at least in the short run, the subsidy policy change
in 1999 does not have a significant demand-side effect on enrollee sorting patterns.
Over time, if the subsidy cap becomes larger, we are more likely to see less adverse
selection among enrollees in the FEHB program.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation analyzes the effect of employer premium contribution schemes
on both the supply and demand side of the health insurance market. Chapter 1
introduces the employer-sponsored health insurance market in the U.S., motivates
why employer premium contribution schemes matter, and reviews previous findings
in the literature. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the supply-side effect of the premium
subsidies, whereas Chapter 4 looks at the demand side.
In Chapter 2, I present an analytical framework to illustrate the effect of
employer premium contribution schemes on health plan pricing. I model the
employer-sponsored health insurance market as a differentiated-product oligopoly
and study the pricing strategies of insurance plans before and after a policy change
in employer premium contribution. I find that the employer premium contribu-
tion scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based on two market
incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need to pay part
of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to increase the
employer’s premium contribution to that plan.
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In Chapter 3, I confirm the theoretical predictions using 1991-2011 data be-
fore and after a premium contribution policy change that occurred in 1999 in the
Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program. Empirical results suggest
that both market incentives mentioned above contribute to premium growth. Fur-
thermore, I perform counterfactual analysis to show that average premium would
have been 10% less than observed had the subsidy policy change not occurred in
the FEHB program, and the federal government would have incurred 15% less in
premium contribution.
Chapter 4 looks at how capped employer premium subsidies affect the level of
adverse selection among consumers. Previous research suggests that the employer
premium contribution scheme can exacerbate or mitigate the level of adverse selec-
tion among consumers. I find empirical evidence supporting the dampening effect
of a higher employer premium subsidy cap on adverse selection. The overall level
of adverse selection in the FEHB program, however, does not change significantly
during 1997-2000. In the long run, as the subsidy cap grows larger, it should
further mitigate adverse selection, which suggests that changes in premium levels
cannot be attributed to higher risk segmentation among federal enrollees.
Admittedly, this study is limited by the data availability both on plan charac-
teristics and employee enrollment choices. Future work would benefit from directly
controlling for other time-varying plan characteristics that could potentially con-
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tribute to premium growth as well as a longer sampling period to analyze adverse
selection. One possible future research topic suggested by this study is to look at
the effect of employer premium contribution schemes on market competition, such
as entry and exit, among health plans in a static or dynamic framework. In terms
of market efficiency, more work is needed in understanding and finding mechanisms
to alleviate information asymmetry in insurance markets.
Appendix A
Solving First Order Conditions
I present the steps to solving the FOCs of the two plans (plan 1 and plan 2) in
my analytical framework before the policy change in 1999, when the subsidy cap
was 60% of the gross premium of the exogenous “Big Six” plans. One can follow
similar procedures to derive the FOCs of the plans after 1999.
Assume before 1999, the dollar maximum the employer can contribute to any
health plan is c. When plan 1 prices above the subsidy cap, the net premium
consumers pay for plan 1 is P̃1 = P1 − c. On the other hand, when plan 1 prices
below the subsidy cap, consumers would pay P̃1 = .25P1. Similarly, consumers pay
a net premium of P̃2 = P2 − c or .25P2 for plan 2 depending on whether plan 2
prices above or below the subsidy cap.
I solve for the case where plan 1 prices above, and plan 2 prices below the
subsidy cap here (P̃1 = P1 − c and P̃2 = .25P2), but one can follow similar steps
to derive the solutions to other cases.
• Plan 1’s FOC
Plan 1 chooses a gross premium P1 to maximize its profit:
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π1 = P1D1(P̃ )− C1D1(P̃ ), (A.1)
where D1 is the demand for plan 1, which depends on the net premium of both
plan 1 and plan 2, and C1 is its marginal cost.
If we normalize the market size to one, the demand for a health plan is equal
to its market share, D1 = S1. Therefore, we can derive the FOC of the above
profit-maximization problem as







exp(α1 − β1P̃1) + exp(α2 − β2P̃2)
is the market share of plan 1.
Substituting P̃1 = P1 − c and P̃2 = .25P2 into plan 1’s market share above,
S1 =
exp(α1 − β1(P1 − c))
exp(α1 − β1(P1 − c)) + exp(α2 − .25β2P2)
.








which gives us the final FOC of plan 1:




• Plan 2’s FOC
By the same token, plan 2 chooses a gross premium P2 to maximize its profit,
and the FOC of its profit-maximization problem is







exp(α1 − β1P̃1) + exp(α2 − β2P̃2)
.
Substituting P̃1 = P1− c and P̃2 = .25P2 into plan 2’s market share above, and







which gives us the final FOC of plan 2:






I present the steps to solving the optimal price and market share of plan 1 expressed
in equations (2.7) and (2.8), closely following the algebraic procedure implemented
in Aravindakshan and Ratchford (2011). One can use the same method to solve
for the optimal prices and market shares of health plans under different subsidy
schemes.
Equations (2.5) and (2.6) illustrate the simultaneity problem between price and
market share in logit models. Substituting the market share equation (2.6) into
the price equation (2.5), I get








1− S1 = 1−
exp(α1 − β1P1)
exp(α1 − β1P1) + exp(α2 − β2P2)
=
exp(α2 − β2P2)















Therefore, I can simplify equation (B.1) into





β1 exp(α2 − β2P2)
. (B.4)
Now I multiply equation (B.4) by β1 and then add α1 on both sides,




After rearranging the above equation, I obtain
α1 − β1P1 +
exp(α1 − β1P1)
exp(α2 − β2P2)
= α1 − 1− β1C1. (B.5)
Taking the exponential on both sides of equation (B.5) and then divide both sides













Recall that the Lambert W function is defined as the inverse function associated
with W (x)eW (x) = x. Assume W =
exp(α1 − β1P1)
exp(α2 − β2P2)
, and I can rewrite (B.6) as
W (x)eW (x) = x,
where x =
exp(α1 − 1− β1C1)
exp(α2 − β2P2)
.
Taking the natural logarithm of equation (B.6) on both sides and substitute in
the newly defined W (x), I get
α1 − β1P1 − (α2 − β2P2) +W (x) = α1 − 1− β1C1 − (α2 − β2P2),
which simplifies to
β1P1 = β1C1 + 1 +W (x).
Solving for the optimal price P ∗1 , I obtain the best response function of plan 1 in
terms of plan 2’s gross premium (P2) presented in equation (2.7)









In order to solve for the optimal market share of plan 1 in equation (2.8), we
can simply substitute W (x) back into equation (B.3) and get
1
1− S1







Solving Remaining Profit Maximization
Problems
C.1 Before 1999: Big Six
• Case 2: P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≥ subsidy cap
When plan 2 prices above the subsidy cap, consumers pay a net premium of
P̃2 = P2 − c, whereas the net premium of plan 1 remains P̃1 = P1 − c. Similar to
case 1, we can write out the Lagrangian function of plan 1’s profit maximization
problem with the inequality constraints P1−c/.75 ≥ 0 and P2−c/.75 ≥ 0. Holding
P2 − c/.75 ≥ 0,
L(P1, λ) = (P1 − C1)D1 + λ(P1 − c/.75).
The FOC when there is an interior solution is
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and plan 1’s market share is
S1 =
exp(α1 − β1(P1 − c))
exp(α1 − β1(P1 − c)) + exp(α2 − β2(P2 − c))
.
Solving the above two simultaneous equations, I derive the best response function
of plan 1 and its market share as follows in terms of P2:








where P ∗1 > c/.75, P2 ≥ c/.75, and x =
exp(α1 − 1− β1(C1 − c))
exp(α2 − β2(P2 − c))
.
When plan 1’s constraint binds, P ∗1 = c/.75, and depending on the optimal
level of P2 (holding P2 ≥ c/.75), we can derive plan 1’s equilibrium market share.
• Case 3: P1 ≤ subsidy cap, P2 ≥ subsidy cap
When plan 1 prices below the subsidy cap, and plan 2 prices above, we have
P̃1 = .25P1 and P̃2 = P2− c. Given the constraints P1 ≤ c/.75 and P2 ≥ c/.75, the
Lagrangian function of plan 1’s profit maximization problem, given P2 ≥ c/.75,
can be written as:
L(P1, λ) = (P1 − C1)D1 + λ(c/.75− P1),
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and plan 1’s best response function and market share in the interior solution are








where P ∗1 < c/.75, P2 ≥ c/.75, and x =
exp(α1 − 1− .25β1C1)
exp(α2 − β2(P2 − c))
. The corner
solution is P ∗1 = c/.75.
• Case 4: P1 ≤ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap
When both plans price below the subsidy cap, we have P̃1 = .25P1 and P̃2 =
.25P2. The Lagrangian function of plan 1 given the constraints P1 ≤ c/.75 and
P2 ≤ c/.75 is
L(P1, λ) = (P1 − C1)D1 + λ(c/.75− P1),
and the interior solution is








where P ∗1 < c/.75, P2 ≤ c/.75, and x =
exp(α1 − 1− .25β1C1)
exp(α2 − .25β2P2)
. The corner
solution is P ∗1 = c/.75.
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Since the simultaneous pricing game plan 1 and 2 play is symmetric, I omit
the derivation process to solve for plan 2’s equilibrium prices and market shares,
as plan 2’s equilibrium solutions are the same as plan 1’s as presented above, after
substituting the subscript 1 with 2 in each case.
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• Case 2: P1 ≥ subsidy cap, P2 ≥ subsidy cap
Given both plans price above the subsidy cap, we have two inequality con-
straints:
P1 ≥ .96(w1P1 + w2P2),
P2 ≥ .96(w1P1 + w2P2).








The Lagrangian function of plan 1 is:
L(P1, λ1, λ2)
= (P1 − C1)D1 + λ1(P1 − .96(w1P1 + w2P2)) + λ2(P2 − .96(w1P1 + w2P2)).
The two corner solutions are P1 = .96(w1P1 + w2P2) and P2 = .96(w1P1 + w2P2),












. When neither constraint
binds, The interior solution can be derived as:
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P ∗1 = C1 +
1 +W (x)






where P ∗1 > .96(w1P
∗
1 + w2P2), P2 > .96(w1P
∗
1 + w2P2), and
x =
exp(α1 − 1− [(1− .72w1)β1 + .72w1β2]C1)
exp(α2 − [(1− .72w2)β2 + .72w2β1]P2)
.
It is easily observed that when both plans price above the subsidy cap, assuming
β1 = β2, the solution to the profit maximization problem after the policy change
is the same as before.
• Case 3: P1 ≤ subsidy cap, P2 ≥ subsidy cap
Case 3 is symmetric to case 1 discussed in Section 2.3.3 in the sense that plan 1
and plan 2 switch roles here as compared to case 1. The two inequality constraints
are now:
P1 ≤ .96(w1P1 + w2P2),
P2 ≥ .96(w1P1 + w2P2).
Similar to case 1, the first constraint implies the second constraint. The net
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premiums consumers pay for both plans are P̃1 = .25P1 and P̃2 = P2− .72(w1P1 +
w2P2), respectively. The Lagrangian function of plan 1’s profit maximization prob-
lem is
L(P1, λ) = (P1 − C1)D1 + λ(.96(w1P1 + w2P2)− P1).






. As for interior
solutions, when P1 < .96(w1P1 + w2P2), the FOC of plan 1 is
P1 = C1 +
1





exp(α1 − .25β1P1) + exp(α2 − β2(P2 − .72(w1P1 + w2P2)))
.
Solving the above simultaneous equations, we get the closed form expressions of
plan 1’s best response function and market share, in terms of P2:
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where P ∗1 < .96(w1P
∗
1 + w2P2), and x =
exp(α1 − 1− (.25β1 + .72w1β2)C1)
exp(α2 − β2(1− .72w2)P2)
.
• Case 4: P1 ≤ subsidy cap, P2 ≤ subsidy cap
It is not possible for both plans to price below the subsidy cap since the fol-
lowing two inequality conditions cannot both hold at the same time:
P1 ≤ .96(w1P1 + w2P2),
P2 ≤ .96(w1P1 + w2P2).
Similar to the pricing game before 1999, the two plans play a symmetric game
here, which means that plan 2’s equilibrium solutions are the same as plan 1’s after
substituting the subscript 1 with 2 in each case.
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